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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GORDON L. WEIGHT,
Plaintiff and Respondent

-vs.HARRY B. MILLER, and HARRY B.
MILLER, dba LORRAINE PRESS,

Case No.
10037

Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an action on a promissory note by Plaintiff Weight, as payee, to recover $1200., interest in

the sum of $392.00 and attorney's fees of $348.33 and
costs of $15.00 from Defendant Miller, the maker.
Said note was executed by defendant on January 2, 1960 for $1200.00 which he received the
previous September from plaintiff as part payment
due in connection with an employment agreement
entered into by the parties on October 1st, 1959.
The note was due October 1, 1960, and the date
of the note was changed, at plaintiff's request, from
January 2, 1960 back to September 1, 1959, the month
the $1200.00 was paid by plaintiff to defendant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2
By the terms of the October 1, 1959 agreement,
plaintiff agreed t~ pay in a total of $5,000.00 to defendant to buy into a going printing business. At
that time it was owned and operated individually,
by defendant. :·
Inter alia, tlle agreement provided-that defendant would incorporate this business, together with
its assets, within one year. further, and in consideration· of plaintiff putting up $5,000. that defendant
would convey $5,000. worth of corporate stock to
plaintiff, plus ari additional amount equal to 8% interest from the time of his investment.
However, plaintiff paid in. only $1200. and either
couldn't, or wouldn't,- pay in·the additional $3800.00.
Defendant honored· the terms of the agreement including hiring· plaintiff at a stipulated salary through
December 1959. On January 2, 1960 the plaintiff persuaded defenda.nt ~to _.prepare the pror.nissory note
for $1200.00, referred to herein, and ,did not thereafter. return to work for the defendant. Instead, he
was hired by another printing company.
Defendant claims that the $1200. paid to him
by plaintiff in September 19_59 was p~rt of the
$5,000.00 which plaintiff was to invest. Further, ·that
plaintiff defaulted the $1200.00 by failing to pay. the
balance due of $3800., or, at most, was entitled only
to $1200. worth of stock in defendant's corporation,
per the provisions of the employment agreement.
Plaintiff contends the $1200. note was in no wise
related to the agreement between the parties _and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that he is.' entitled to his money, interest, costs and
attorneys fees.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah
f~urid for plaintiff and granted judgment to him f~r
the $1200., plus $392. interest, attorney's fees of
$34~.33 and $15. costs a9ainst Defendant..
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant Harry B. Miller seeks a 'reversal of
the. decision of the court in awarding. this money
judgment; the Plaintiff Gordon L .Weight seeks to
have sustained the decision· of the court in awarding him. this judgment.
. .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the ·autumn of 1959 plaintiff approached
defendant and told him that he had some ideas for
making money in the printing business, namely .by
going into the offset printing phase, (R 63, 64 & 65)
further that' he·: could 'get $5,000. to invest in 'Defendant's ·busihess,. ptovided'·he w6uld hire plaintiff :·and give him a ·firiancial interest in the business.
After several 'discussions (R 65) during which they
agreed upon the general terms, the parties retained
plaintiff's attorney, Ray Montgomery, to draw up
the agreement, which was to become effective on
!0ctober·1.· 1959~ ···
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After the initial discussions, and before the
papers were signed, plaintiff paid defendant sums
of $700. and $500., totalling $1200. Defendant used
the first $700. as down payment on one of two printing presses which were needed in the new offset
prmting venture. By paying cash within 35 days on
the one machine, the parties could save $700. (R 67).
With assurances from plaintiff that he could get the
balance due of $3800_ defendant purchased the
printing press, but later had to borrow money to pay
for it, at high interest rates, when plaintiff failed to
pay the balance he had agreed. {R 69).
The October 1, 1959 agreement executed by
both parties: (Exhibit 2-d) had 8 provisions, 6 of
which are material here. These provided (1) Agreement would be for one year; (2) Both parties were to
devote full time and attention to this business; (3)
Plaintiff was guaranteed a salary based on the union
pay scale, payable twice each month, and defendant
was to bear any losses sustained in the business;
(4) Plaintiff was to use his own auto, but was to be
reimbursed for gas and oil and other business expenses; (5) Plaintiff was to loan defendant $5,000. "to
be used for the furtherance of the business and is
to be secured by a personal note with" ... 8% interest, and said "promissory note is hereby referred
to and incorporated within this document as part
of the agreement" . . . (6) Defendant agreed to incorporate the business within one year, repay
plaintiff in the form of stock of the corporation and
also give him an option to buy up to a total of 25%
of all the corporate stock at par value, and to appoint
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5
plaintiff as a director when the corporation was
formed.
Plaintiff worked for defendant from October 1
through December 31, 1959, and received the agreed
salary and expenses (R 40, 52, 53 &58). Plaintiff never
paid any more on his $5,000. committment, although
defendant often reminded him of it (R 61, 71, 8l).Each
received a copy of the written agreement. Attorney
Montgomery had prepared a note, which was undated, unsigned, and with the amount left in blank
which plaintiff claims he gave to defendant, but
which defendant denies ever seeing, (R 70).
Finally, on January 2, 1960, after plaintiff continued
to complain to defendant about not having any evidence for his $1200. investment, defendant told
plaintiff to go out and buy a note and that he, defendant, would sign it. (R 72). This was done
and defendant had the form note made out for $1200.,
with 8% annual interest, from October l, 1959; it
provided for attorney's fee. When plaintiff noted
that the note was dated January 2, 1960, he requested defendant to date it back to September 1, 1959,
in order to protect him on the 8% interest which he
had coming, which defendant did. (Exhibit 1-P)
(R 73). After receiving the executed note for
$1200. from defendant on January 2, 1960, the plaintiff never reported for work again, although he did
come back on January 18, for a $16. gas expense
check, at which time he told both the defendant and
the bookkeeper, Ruth Marks, that he was working
for a competitor printing firm {R 54, 85, 86).
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6·
Defendant and Mrs. Marks each testified that
Defendant did incorporate his printing business,
The Lorraine Press, on September 30, 1960, prior to
the end of the one year period provided for in the
agreement (R 46). Too, the certified copy of
the articles of incorporation indicate the meeting of
incorporation was held on September 27, 1960, with
said articles being received by the Secretary of
Utah on September 30, 1960. (Exhibit No. 10-d).
Further that Plaintiff's name, Gordon L. Weight was
shown in Article VI. as -an incorporator, and in Article VII as a director, although the name was later
drawn through and the name of Defendant Miller's
attorney, Thomas P. Vuyk, was written in.
Defendant testified that plaintiff worked well for
the first two months after which time both defendant
and the bookkeeper testified that plaintiff broke appointments with customers, never reported in to
the office and otherwise indicated a loss of interest
in his work (R 74, 76). Mr. Montgomery, the attorney friend of plaintiff, who drew the business
agreement of October 1, 1959 testified that defendant
telephoned him in December 1959 and reported that
he was disappointed in the plaintiff's work at that
time and that he might have to let him go. He likewise testified that he had a talk with plaintiff a week
prior to this "at his own home." Plaintiff complained
to Montgomery that he hadn't been taken into the
management and executive part of the business,
and that he was supposed to be, according to the
agreement. (R. 99 & 100). However, the agreement
(exhibit 2-d) does not provide anywhere for bringing
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plaintiff into management or as an executive of the
business. At this time Mr. Montgomery said he told
the plaintiff that he hadn't better breach the contract
by quitting, or he would be in default on the contract, and the plaintiff told his lawyer that he would
continue working. (R. 100). During the same period,
December 1959, plaintiff claims that defendant told
him that he was now on a 10% commission, effective
immediately, because of his lack of production in
the business (R 28). However, both defendant,
and the then bookkeeper, Mrs. Marks, testified that
he was paid his full salary through December 1959
(R 40, 52, 88) and that he was the one who breached
the agreement by quitting work with defendant and
taking employment elsewhere.
The defendant was not certain whether plaintiff was still working for him or not, until the plaintiff told him and Mrs. Marks, on January 18th, 1960,
when he came for his gas expense check, that he
had another job with Eric Seaich Company
(R 41,54, 85) for whom he was employed for six or
seven months thereafter.
Defendant told plaintiff on one occasion when
they met in the State Capitol Building, after defendant had incorporated the business that he, the
plail'!tiff, did have stock coming for the $1200., but
that he would not make a cash settlement. (R 79).
Neither party ever agreed that the $1200. note was
to be paid for in cash and there is no evidence that
the note was given as anything more than an indication that plaintiff had $1200. of his $5,000. invested into the business. (R 39).
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POINTS URGED FOR REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT.
POINT I. DEFENDANT SHOULD EITHER HAVE
BEEN ENTITLEn TO RETAIN THE $1200. PAID IN
UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO PAY
PLAINTIFF IN THE STOCK OF THE 'CORPORATION TO BE FORMED, AS SPE CIFIED IN SAID
AGREEMENT.
1

Plaintiff admits that he paid in only $1200.00
of the $5,000 agreed upon in the employment agreement. Further, he admits that this $1200. paid in,
in September 1959, was part of the sum of $5,000
which he had agreed to pay in on the agreement.
(R 17, 25, 39). Further, that the $1200. note which he
persuaded defendant to sign on January 2, 1960 was
for the $1200.00 he paid in as part of the employment
agreement of September 30, 1959. (R 17, 25, 39).
There was no evidence that there was a mutual
agreement to terminate this employment contract.
Defendant, before the end of the 12 month term
of the employment agreement, did incorporate the
Lorraine Press from the assets of the individual
printing business which he owned, and as required
by this agreement between defendant and plaintiff.
(See certified copy of Articles of Incorporation exhibit 10-d).
Although there were evidences of disharmony
between the parties, concerning the employment
and salary portion of the agreement, there was no
demand by either party upon the other in this reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gard, although appellant stated he made numerous
requests upon plaintiff for the balance due of
$3800. on his investment in appellant's business.
(R 67, 68, 71, 81, 82, 83, 84).
Plaintiff's exhibit (exhibit 3-P), an undated:
unsigned, and incompleted note, is relied upon by
him to claim that, as evidence of the original intent
of the parties when the employment agreement was
drawn, it shows that he was entitled to money, not
stock, for his $1200. because this unsigned document so stated. However, upon close examination of
this unsigned note, it is indicated that the language
relied upon by respondent reads, "Should there be
a default in the foregoing provisions," ... then the
money, rather than the stock, is to be paid. The "foreqoing provision" referred to refers to the duty of the
appellant to incorporate, obviously, and reads,
"It is hereby agreed that the said ·----------------------dollars shall be paid in the form of stock of a corporation from the assets of the Lorraine Press on or
before the due date of the note or within a reasonable length of time thereafter."

If this exhibit 3-P is to be given any credence by
the court, it should be accurately read and interpreted, and in conjunction with the employment
agreement of September 30, 1959 which reads, in
the last sentence of the Sixth paragraph therein:
"The promissory note is hereby referred to and incorporated within this document as part of the agreement between Harry B. Miller and Gordon L.
WeighL"
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This unsigned, ,"Promissory Note", exhibit 3-P,
and the Agreement exhibit 2-D, which incorporates
it into and makes it a part of said Agreement, provides for the payment "in the form of stock of a corporation". If there is a default in· this provision, i.e.
if the corporation is not formed, "or should the
parties mutually agree to terminate their agreement"
which they did not do, then all of the money paid in
would become due and payable. When read together, no other conclusion is tenable. in this action.
Defendant testified that he had offered $1200.
in stock, plus interest, to plaintiff, and alleged the
same i~ his Answer (R 23, 79).
Plaintiff testified that he never returned to
work after January 2, 1960, which was the date he
persuaded defendant to sign the $1200. note, althought he never advised defendant that he was
quitting, and never asked for nor received a termination slip; some two weeks later, when he went back
for a gas expense check, plaintiff states he
mentioned that he was going to work for Eric Seaich
(another printer), although defendant and witness
Ruth Marks testified that he stated he was then
working for Seaich, which was the first they knew
of his not working for Lorraine Press (R 41, 54, 85, 86).
Plaintiff also testified that he was not paid
for the last two weeks of December 1959, while employed by defendant; however defendant's bookkeeper testified from her records, and defendant
likewise testified that plaintiff received salary
checks, based on the employment agreement
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through December 1959, as well as gas expense payments (R 40, 52, 53, 88).
Defendant stated that he felt obligated to incorporate within the one year period, or it would have
been necessary to refund the $1200. sum which
plaintiff had paid in on his $5,000. committment.
Unless incorporated, defendant states that he knew
he would have been in default and would have had
to repay plaintiff in money (R 77, 93). Both defendant and Mrs. Marks testified that the incorporation papers were received by the Secretary of State
of Utah on September 30, 1960 (R 46).
Defendant testified that he wasn't happy with
plaintiff's performance during December 1959,
but that he wasn't so unhappy with him as to terminate him (R 86, 87) and admitted talking with him
about the salary he was receiving and which was
considerably more than the salesman's commission
he would have received on the business he had produced (R 87, 88, 89). Defendant must not have known,
when he signed the $1200. note for plaintiff on
January 2, 1960, that plaintiff had, as of that time,
decided to quit his· job with defendant. Otherwise
he would not have signed the note without ascertaining that he might be binding himself for payment
of money ,rather than stock.
POINT II. DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE
PENALIZED BY PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO
TREAT THE PRINTED NOTE FOR $1200., AS HAVING NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT AND BY HAVING THE LOWER
COURT ALTER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT
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FROM PAYMENT IN "STOCK" TO PAYMENT IN
"MONEY".

Utah's Rules of Civll Procedure, Rule 16, states,
in part, such (pretrial) order when entered controls
the subsequent course of the action, unless modified
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." In the instant case ,there was no modification of the pre-trial
order, nor amendment of the pleadings. Instead,
the lower court required several issues to be developed, which defendant was not prepared to meet,
and which were completely foreign to the single
pre-trial question. This was prejudicial error to defendant. Subject to the qualification that the court
may modify its order, the parties are bound by the
pre-trial order. In support of this rule are Fowler vs.
Crown-Zellerbach Corp. 163 F 2d 773 (CCA9th) and
Fanciullo vs. G. B.G. & S. Theatre Corp. (Mass) 8 NE
(2d) 174.
The court's pre-trial terms may not be contradicted, according to Ringling Bros. vs. Olvera
(V CCA9th) 119 F2d 584, and Berry vs. Spokane RR
Co. (Oreg) 6 FR Serv 16.32, Case l, and 2 FRD 483.
Further, the court should not give instructions contrary nor inconsistent with its pre-trial order. Bryant
vs. Phoenix Bridge Co. (Me) 43 F Supp 162 and E.
W. Baker vs. Lagaly (CCA lOth) 144 F2d 344. Both
parties are bound, equally, by the pre-trial order,
Daitz Flying Corp. vs. U.S. (NY) 8 FR Serv 16.23,
Case 1, 4 FRD 372.
In the instant case there was no "manifest in·
justice" to prevent. And, if the pre-trial order did not
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properly reflect the contentions of the parties, it
could have been set aside, before the trial, and a
new conference ordered. No one contended the
order was inadequate in this case. Authority for
this is an Oregon case, Calvin vs. West Coast Power
Co. 5 FR Serv 16.33, Case 1, 2 FRD 248.
Defendant testified, and it was not rebutted, that
by December 1959, plaintiff had mentioned that
it didn't look as if the $5,000. investment was going
through; further that he, plaintiff, did want some
evidence that he had loaned $1200. to defendant,
at which time defendant instructed him to make up
a note, which was done. Defendant, at plaintiff's
request at that time, also dated back the note to confonn to the month, September 1959, which was the
month plaintiff stated he had made the $1200. down
payment on the $5,000. {R 72, 73).
The actions of the plaintiff in obtaining the
$1200. note on January 2, 1960, never returning to
work thereafter, nor asking for a termination slip
would indicate that he had then mentally resolved
to leave the Lorraine Press. If he had not been quitting defendant's employment, surely he would have
asked for the last two weeks pay ,to which he was
entitled, and which he claims he didn't get, as well
as a termination slip, which would have enabled
him to obtain unemployment benefits while seeking other employment.
Counsel for the plaintiff contended, at the trial
that the $1200. note signed by defendant on January 2, 1960, and then dated back, at plaintiff's reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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quest. to September 1, 1959, was a different
promissory note from any note referred to in the
contract, and therefore had nothing to do with the
employment agreement of September 30, 1959. (R 8,
9). Plaintiff also stated that he could not see what
the employment agreement had to do with the $1200.
.promissory note (16).
However, plaintiff testified that the executed
note for $1200. was obtained to replace the note
originally prepared by his counsel, and which was
lost or misplaced before it was executed by appellant '(R 10, 39, 65, 70). Plaintiff likewise stipulated
that the date ·of January 2, 1960, on the $1200. note
was chariged back to September l, 1959, and that the
$1200. paid to defendant in September 1959, and evidenced by this note in the same amount, was part
of the $5,000. which plaintiff agreed to pay defendant, per the terms of the employment agreement
(R 11, 12).
Plaintiff further testified that there was no
urgency in paying in the $5,000., which he agreed
to pay. (R 13). However, he knew that defendant was
goirig to use the money to buy a new press for
$4,000. in furtherance of the business. (R 13, 14).
When that portion of the employment agreement was read to plaintiff which required defendant to incorporate within a year, and to pay
plaintiff in stock for monies invested, at 8% interest, he indicated that he was thoroughly familiar
with these terms, although he had no information
as to whether the incorporation actually took place
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(R 15, 17, 18). Further, in January 1960, during a

discussion, plaintiff reminded defendant of their
contract (R 28), indicating that he considered it in
existence at that time.
POINT III. THE LOWER. COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING MORE THAN THE ONE QUESTION
AGREED UPON AT THE PRE-TRIAL, NAMELY,
WHETHER THE $1200. NOTE WAS ANY PART OF
THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.

The Lower court erred in failing to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint o£ plaintiff's after testimony given by the plaintiff clearly
show that the $1200. note was part of the employment agreement between the parties. (R 42).
The court then erred further in determining
whether the agreement had ever been mutually
tenninated, in admitting a copy of the original note,
in blank, which was never executed, and which was
prepared by plaintiff's attorney at the time the
agreement was prepared (R 33).
Although the plaintiff testified that the
$1200. note was part of the agreement, which was
the only question to be determined, and at which
point plaintiff's case should have been dismissed, the lower court still ruled th~t.the agreement
had been "scrapped" and the note for $1200. was
for monies had and received, and not repaid (R 102,
103).
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's action
should have been granted after testimony given by
the plaintiff indicated that the $1200. -note was defiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nitely part of and related to the employment agreement entered into by the parties. Plaintiff stated a
recoverable claim, but failed to prove it in the evidence given by him at the trial. Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 41 (b); Rasmussen vs. Davis, 1 Utah
(2d) 96; 262 P (2d) 488; Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah
(2d) 16; 268 p (2d) 986.
In this type of employment contract, where additional consideration, other than services, moves
from the employee to the employer, in the absence
of terms of the contrary, such agreements may continue as long as the employee is able and will w
do his work satisfactorily. This rule is recognized
in an Indiana case, Pa. Co. vs. Dolan, 32 N.E. 802
and in Skagerberg vs. Blandin Paper Co. (Minn.) 266
N.W. 872.
Other cases say this right continues as long as
the employer is in business and needs the employee's services. In accord are Carnig vs. Carr,
(Mass.) 46 N.E. 117 and Rape vs. Mobile & 0. R. Co.
(Miss.) l 00 So. 585.
If defendant had fired plaintiff, as claimed, the
former had numerous rights of action against defendant. Instead, plaintiff accepted other employment, for less money, he stated, (R 21) and without
actually notifying defendant that he was quitting his
job. When plaintiff learned that his investment
would not enable him to start out as an executive, in
the management of the business, and that he would
have to work for his salary, he arbitrarily decided
to quit. (R 36, 99, 100).
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Defendant's position is that plaintiff breached
the employment agreement when he failed to return to work in January 1960. Defendant went on and
later incorporated, within the 12 month period required by his agreement with plaintiff. Defendant,
in effect, waived the breach by the plaintiff and did
not sue on said breach, neither for the balance of
$3800. pledged, nor by plaintiff leaving his employment. Defendant was within his rights to keep the
agreement in force and to later incorporate. Snowball vs. Maney Bros. Co. (\Nyo.) 270 Pac. 167., Forbes
vs. Appleyard, (Mass.) 63 N.E. 894 and In Re Hook
(DC.) 25 F (2d) 498. Subscribing to this rule also is
Page on Contracts, 2nd Edition, Sections 3038, 3042,
and 3060.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Court erred in
giving a decision against defendant Miller and in
favor of plaintiff Weight for $1200., plus $755.33
attorneys fees, interest and costs.
The testimony given several times by plaintiff
Weight clearly shows that the $1200. promissory
note, executed by defendant Miller, was without
question, part of the employment agreement
referred to, a copy of which was attached to the
Answer, and the original of which was introduced
as plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P.
The pre-trial order stated that this was the only
question for the Trial Court to determine; on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

basis of the plaintiff's own testimony in the
Record, we submit that the Trial Court erred in holding that the note should have been paid in dollars,
instead of in stock, as was provided for in the employment contract.
Respectfully submitted,
MERRILL K. DAVIS
A ttdrley for Defendant and

Appellant
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